fended not only because of the water, but because it is intrinsically tied to communal values and cultural identity.
Although the Southwest shares much in common with the arid West generally, there are additional challenges present in the Southwest that can be used as a lens to explore the environmental justice implications of basinwide management. An exhaustive discussion of these diverse issues is not possible in a comment of this scope. Instead, the environ mental justice issues are raised with a view toward advancing the dis cussion of an alternative system based upon consolidated authority at the basin level, and how water-dependent communities with meager re sources and little political influence might fare under such a system.
II. Environmental Justice Issues
Under the Current System "Environmental justice" is a term used to self-consciously describe a political movement that is centered around grassroots organizing with a mission to address both the unequal distribution of environmental bur dens and amenities, and the impediments to fair process that serve to ex clude low-income and communities of color, tribal governments, and indigenous people from important decisions about their environments and their lives. Environmental justice is tied to a broader mission of so cial and economic justice. Although organizing begins at the local level and is guided by principles of environmental justice that were collec tively adopted in 1991, 5 local organizations often affiliate with net works 6 and address regional, national, and international issues as well. Often, the term "environmental justice" is used as a catchphrase to describe the conditions that gave rise to the movement. For example, in dividuals that are familiar with the phrase often associate environmen tal justice with controversies over the siting of large hazardous waste facilities, because those were the first high-profile issues that caught the public's attention.
7 Of course, indigenous communities, people of range of agency activities carried out by federal and sub-federal agen cies. For example, environmental justice advocates have challenged the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the way that policy is developed and implemented, programs designed, standards set, facili ties permitted, laws enforced, and contaminated sites cleaned up.
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They have challenged transportation policies, 14 examined beach aer cess, 15 and contested the placement of parks and green spaces. 16 Activ ists have also addressed a myriad of process issues as well. In the course of addressing environmental issues, they have often found themselves cut off from effective participation by a variety of obstacles.
17 Some times, it has been due to the hostility of other stakeholders and gover n mental officials.
18 Other times, it has been due to lack of time, resources, and technical experts. But there are more subtle impediments to effective participation and advocacy. The way that decisionmaking structures are designed, and the biases embedded in them, often serve to assume away, trivialize, or eclipse environmental justice issues.
19 Thus, analyzing these power structures and decisionmaking processes, and devising strategies for negotiating the unequal playing field of environ mental protection, land use, and water law, is "bread and butter" envi ronmental justice work. By virtue of their intimate connection to the land and their economic vulnerability, environmental justice communi ties fully appreciate, perhaps better than most stakeholders, that the is sues cannot be reduced to simplistic jobs or environment choices. N 
Eileen Gauna, An Essay on Environmental
A. Water Flow and Availability
A river's natural hydrological cycle, or flow regime, includes periodic flooding and other "keystone" processes. 20 In order for a river to remain healthy and alive, some conservationists argue that dams, drains, and diversions should attempt to mimic the natural hydrograph of the river. For example, one conservationist proposes the creation of a levy system that allows the natural overbank spring flows to promote regeneration of cottonwoods, speed decomposition and recycling of nutrients, or carry off or dampen understory fuels. 21 To preserve endangered species, there is also the need to keep flows higher than might otherwise occur under allocations and diversions presently allowed under the existing water rights regime. These are but a few examples of the changing state of conventional wisdom. In place of the aggressive plumbing projects of the empire builders of past generations, the idea now is to keep rivers in their natural state and leave as much water in them as possible. Both of these ideas find support in Dry/and Democracy and Professor Neuman's discussion of Powell's vision of a sustainable West. In the abstract, this sounds like an ecologically sound idea, but to do so under the West's existing system of water rights will put intense pressures on current water users. The fundamental question remains: which users are likely to be the most vulnerable to increased scarcity in the amount of water available for diversion and consumptive uses?
One of the losers in this ecological project might be the acequia com munities of northern New Mexico and southern Colorado, communities that are already struggling to maintain a traditional vision of shared wa ter use, which is at odds with the current law of prior appropriation. The case of the acequias in Colorado's Rio Culebra Watershed provides a good example of these vulnerabilities. In this discussion I draw largely upon the work of anthropology professor Devon Pena and law professor Gregory Hicks. Professors Pefi.a and Hicks, in a recent work, carefully map out the history and the social and legal complexities of the acequia communities of southern Colorado.
22 I also draw heavily from the work of David Benavidez, an attorney who works closely with acequia com munities in northern New Mexico.
23
Other than Native American tribal governments, acequia communal arrangements are among the oldest local governmental institutions in the United States.
24 They are centered around a system of building and maintaining intricate, gravity-fed ditch irrigation systems that rely heavily upon knowledge oflocal topography and environmental condi tions and farming techni qu es that are passed from generation to genera tion. The acequias are not simply irrigation and farming technology, but stable cultural practices, norms that gave rise to a strong sense of community identity.
25 Hicks and Pefi.a have identified five major princi- The Association has over the years emphasized the impor tance of reproducing the next generation of acequia farmers. A concern for the needs of limited resource farmers extends to the provision of services for women and youth who are just starting to engage in agricultural work. One strategy has been to provide new farmers with support in acquiring heirloom seeds, gaining access to planting, cultivating, and harvesting equipment, and mentoring them in the arts of flood irrigation. The sharing of re sources also involves an infonnal network of seed savers and exchangers. In fact, the practice of heirloom seed saving is one of the most significant cultural traditions among acequia farm ers of the Culebra watershed. Heirloom seed saving represents a connection to past generations and is an important agroecological adaptation to place .... strong is this norm that some communities (through individual rights holders) have even rejected lucrative offers to buy water rights in times of plenty.
Id
29 A complementary principle, the "right of thirst," holds that water is also for the benefit of the plants and animals of the acequia ecosystem, and because of that principle, acequia communi ties have resisted the Colorado State Engineer's request to line ditches with cement. 3 0 Not only is the right of thirst more in line with current ecological thinking, the wild plants and animals that the banks of the acequias support are important sources of food or medicine for the acequia communities.
31
Some states recognize the acequia system in limited respects. For ex ample, New Mexico provides that the acequias themselves are tenan cies in common, and acequias are political subdivisions of the state, but the water rights are privatized, a feature not recognized under prior sov ereigns. 3 2 To successfully operate within a regime of individual prop- Careful not to romanticize, the authors note that this arrangement is compelled by strict necessity. Everyone in the acequia system, from the mayordomo ( ditch boss), to the comisionados (commissioners), to the participantes understand that the whole system depends upon feasance to these norms. The maintenance of the irrigation system depends upon shared labor and values. Thus, even the most senior rights holders are not individually secure under a system of strict prior appropriation. 34 33. Hicks & Pena, supra note 22, at 166-67.
Hicks and Pena explain:
[T]he very holders of senior water rights, who benefited from the priority established by Colorado water law, believed that their own interests would be jeopardized if the holders of junior rights were forced to sell their land and water rights because of continuing scarcity. The possible shift of water away from acequia-dependent uses threatened the end of the acequias as a water delivery system and as a political, economic, and social institution vital to the cohesion of the community.
A new generation of uses that neither depended upon the acequia system nor provided usable return flows to the acequias would reduce the total volume of water carried through the acequias, frustrating the ability of the earthen ditch networks to operate. Another basis of concern was that the com munity of labor that has maintained the ditch system at rela tively low cost would be undermined if land in the watershed were separated from the acequia system. Neighbors would no longer look to each other to keep the system up. At a certain point there would be too few owners to maintain the acequia system, and those who remained would lack the resources to purchase services to replace the many acts of mutual aid and forbearance that define the acequia neighborhood and allow it to function. The successor system, and the successor landscape, would, it was feared, be inferior with respect to functionality and to amenity. 48 With regulators' inclination to avoid socioeconomic is sues, the more powerful interests with greater resources to purchase water rights will inevitably prevail, notwithstanding the serious social costs that may ensue.
B. Water Quality
There are also serious water quality issues facing environmental justice communities in the Southwest. In general, water pollution is direct and obvious, such as contaminated runoff, facility effluent, and deposition of air pollutants into surface waters. But there are less obvious reasons why water pollution affects people of color, native populations, and the poor more than the general public. The key to this fact lies in the way that the Clean Water Act (CWA) is administered.
49 Under this Act, point sources ( factories, for example) must acquire a permit before dis charging pollutants into a body of water. There is very little in the way of mandatory requirements for nonpoint sources, e.g., agricultural prac tices that result in pesticide and fertilizer runoff. The point sources are required to use technology-based standards to control the pollutants in their discharged effluent. As the term suggests, these standards are based upon control technology currently available, and when combined with similar dischargers and nonpoint runoff on the same water body, the water can be severely polluted despite the fact that none of the pol lutants are entering the river or lake illegally. In an attempt to avoid or correct this situation, the CW A requires states to designate the uses for each body of water and adopt water quality standards for the designated use. For example, a "fishable-swimmable" designated use requires wa ter quality adequate to support those uses, i.e., that pollutant levels will be low enough so that the fish caught and consumed will be safe to eat. If the water body does not meet the water quality standards for various 
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in King County, Wash.; and the Suquamish Tribe). Although EPA's revised default assumptions of 17.5 g/day, representing the 90th percentile of the general population, and 142.4 g/day, repre senting the 99th percentile of the general population are a marked improvement over its previous assumption of 6.5 g/day, the re vised defaults still considerably underestimate exposure for many affected communities and tribes.
51
Clearly, a water basin institution with a mission to preserve the integrity of the basin ecosystem must address the issue of water quality stan dards, point and nonpoint pollution. A consolidation of authority only over water allocation and land use laws would not be sufficient; the basin institution would have to have delegated federal authority un der environmental laws, for example authority to adopt water qual ity standards. Another major problem with achieving even existing (insufficiently protective) standards is that pesticide and fertilizer runoff, as well as other nonpoint pollution, has continued virtually unregulated under the CW A. Within the last few years, there has been increased regulatory ac tivity around a planning provision that requires states to come up with total maximum daily load (TMDL) plans for water quality limited wa ters. 5 2 These plans are supposed to bring in nonpoint source pollution control as well. However, as explained by Prof. Oliver Houck, this kind of ambient-based regulation is hampered by the limited state of science and the substantially limited state of political will. 5 3 If states were to delegate TMDL.planning and implementation authority to a water basin institution (assuming it were legal to do so), the institution would en counter the same difficulties and the same powerful interest groups that have resisted TMDL planning. And the basin institutions would have to devise a way to increase the capacity for meaningful participation of en vironmental justice communities within this planning process, a feat that has yet to be accomplished under current regulation. Another par ticularly difficult task for a basin institution will be controlling air pol lution, particularly the deposition of mercury, which comes largely from power plants. Mercury 
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Wet Growth: Should Water Law Control Land Use? maximum achievable control technology ((MACT) standards), but the Bush Administration is vigorously promoting a "Clear Skies Initiative" in the fonn of proposed legislation that will allow power plants to trade emission allowances and will delay mercury controls required under current law. Depending upon how these types of trading regimes are de signed-and they are often designed to provide maximum flexibility for facility operators-then "hot spots" can occur when a large facility or group of facilities decides to buy emission allowances rather than in stall stringent pollution control. It might be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for a water basin institution to control deposition of air borne mercury into water bodies under this type of regime.
One might reason that a water basin institution, with land use author ity within the basin ecosystem, would be able to better exercise control over new facility siting and facility expansions and would do so with an eye toward protecting the river or lake and, indirectly, the populations that rely upon that water body. But under the current system, these emission-and effluent-increasing activities continue to take the path of least resistance and end up in indigenous, low-income, and people of color communities.
54 More so, perhaps, in the demographically chang ing arid West. Recent studies from the Los Angeles area strongly sug gest that the statistical community of choice for siting unwanted land uses is a community undergoing an ethnic shift from one community of color to another. The authors of this study posit that social ties are weak ened when a community is experiencing a population transition; there fore, these communities are even less able to organize and challenge a facility siting or expansion. 55 Add to these land use problems the limited 54. In two studies, Prof. James Hamilton has looked at how capacity decisions of hazardous waste facilities correlate with the demographics of host com munities. In the first, using data at the county level, Professor Hamilton found that race and income were not significant factors in expansion dec i sions by facilities from 1987 to 1992, but that race was a significant determi nant of the facilities' plans to reduce capacity of waste facilities (facilities in white communities were more likely to reduce capacity than facilities in communities of color). Hamilton also found that both race and income wer e significant predictors of where hazardous waste facilities were sited in the 1970s and early 1980s. James T. 
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The result is that a basin institution willing to accept plenary authority will have challenges that do not rest exclusively with water flow, avail ability, and quality. Sound policy necessitates a broader mission to con trol and correct indirect but significant social costs. 
C. The Clash of Values
Ill. Environmental Justice Under a Water Basin Institution
A. Consolidating Authority
Before discussing how environmental justice concerns might fare under a basin management approach, it is important to anticipate the process of consolidating authority. To be sure, an agency's penchant for turf guarding will be the biggest political obstacle. And Professor Neuman is correct in pointing out that agency power so jealously guarded is illu sory to begin with, considering that it ultimately ends up simply as the power to guard power, or defend decisions, in protracted court proceed ings. But there is a special consideration in what might otherwise appear to be a dysfunctional tendency of governmental institutions. That con sideration concerns the sovereignty of Native American tribes. Tribal sovereignty has been steadily under attack for decades, and every legal challenge to this sovereignty brings increasing concern for tribal gov ernments. tect the tribe's use of the Rio Grande for ceremonial purposes. The up stream city of Albuquerque protested, in large part because discharges allowed under a water treatment facility's national pollutant discharge elimination system permit would cause a violation of the water quality standards in the downstream segment used by the tribe. Ultimately the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld EPA's approval of the tribe's water quality standards. One has to wonder how this case, not only involving different uses of the water resource but involving a conflict of fundamentally different cultural and religious values, would be resolved under the processes of a basinwide institution with consolidated authority spanning several states. One also has to wonder if Native American tribes will be amenable to giving up the protection of hard-fought legal victories upon a blind faith in a newly created water-basin institution with a larger set of stakeholders. As such, the consolidation process itself must have substantial partici pation by tribal governments, and there would have to be concrete assurances that noneconomic cultural values will be preserved by the basin institution and that U.S. trust responsibility is fully recognized and implemented.
B. Potential Benefits
Assuming such assurances are made, that federal, state, and local law is changed to allow for the creation ofbasinwide institutions with expan sive consolidated authority, and that sufficient resources are allocated toward that end, one can easily imagine the potential benefits of such a regulatory regime. A basinwide institution that has sufficient authority over water allocation, including groundwater pumping and agricul tural, industrial, and other land use practices, is much better posi tioned to address cross-media problems. In fact, a water body is perhaps the best "indicator media." Just as the presence and plentitude of certain species are indicative of the overall health of an ecosystem, such as an old growth forest, the health of a water body is similarly in dicative of the overall health of the regional land ecosystem as well. A free-flowing water body that can support healthy native aquatic spe cies can be accomplished only by controlling soil and groundwater contamination, fertilizer and pesticide runoff, deposition of air pollut ants, sediment from construction, and runoff of pollutants from as phalt and other impervious surfaces. In this respect, basin institutions have the potential to serve the broader purpose of addressing cross media pollution problems.
Environmental Justice in a Dryland Democracy: A Comment on Water Basin Institutions 193
The more direct environmental justice benefits are equally attractive. Populations that rely on subsistence fishing will not have to continue to suppress their historical intake of protein due to frequent fish adviso ries. A basinwide approach seems better equipped to prevent toxic hot spots caused by too many point source discharges in one area and is better equipped to address the cumulative pollutant load from multiple source contributors, including nonpoint sources.
There are additional advantages to a basin institution with authority over land use matters. It will be better positioned to curb subsidies that not only result in inappropriate highly intensive water use, as described by Professor Neuman, but it can curb subsidies that result in additional pollution. A good example of this can also be found in New Mexico, where the issuance of an industrial revenue bond for the Intel facility was questioned on the grounds that the facility would use an enormous amount of water and emit highly toxic chemicals as well. 64 As a result, curbing subsidies for plumbing, intensive water uses, and less direct subsidies that potentially impair water quality ultimately will result in abundant free flowing clean water throughout the basin.
C. Potential Pitfalls
As appealing as this idea is from an ecological perspective, however, there might be hidden distributional problems and social costs. If there is more water left in the river system to support adequate flow for a ro bust system, then there will be less water for residential, agricultural, commercial, and industrial uses associated with any given river system. The risk of a priority call under prior appropriation law will be more likely, or at least it might be perceived to be more likely. 65 One has to contemplate what this new economic dynamic might mean for water right holders in more poor areas, where the residents own land but have little money or economic development. Will this result in displacement of modest but stable communities? Could this in tum have a racially dis proportionate effect on people of color throughout the Southwest? It seems unlikely that a water basin institution-even if well run and un deniably devoted to the public interest-would be able to ward off some of the effects of the inevitable water scarcity that an ecosystem ap proach would generate. These inequities are likely to become more Aside from the economic questions, there are fundamental questions of process and how the water basin institution will govern and resolve competing interests. In Dry/and Democracy, Professor Neuman sug gests that this management approach might be more amenable to place-based decisionmaking. However, there are obvious difficulties accomplishing this in large river systems that span several states and contain numerous tributaries. Once water law, land use, and environ mental regulatory authority are consolidated, very powerful vested stakeholder interests will become actively engaged in the inevitable tug of war over implementation policy and the interpretation of the statutes and regulations involved. In addition to the usual private stakeholders, there will be another group of powerful stakeholders-the very agen cies that ceded authority to the water basin institution to begin with. Particularly when the basin institution is involved in planning and rulemaking, the stakeholders most likely to participate are those with significant regulatory interests and economic stakes, such as the major water users. Non-major water users and parties that may be indirect 'l; impacted by water decisions do not participate in the current system, 7
and there is little to suggest that would change. Lack of participation is not necessaril i due to lack of interest, but rather lack of time and techni cal resources. One way to avoid this unfortunate result is for the water basin institution to play an active role in building the capacity of envi ronmental justice communities to participate in the process. However, agencies typically profess a studious philosophy of neutrality toward stakeholders. Understandably, these governmental institutions do not like to be accused of preferring one set of stakeholders over others. While adherence to a such policy may be admirable in the abstract, hands-off neutrality ultimately allows regulatory processes to be domi nated by well-financed interest groups. Since we are already in the realm of radical alternatives, a basin institution would do well to reject the "neutral umpire" proclivities ofits predecessor agencies. Moreover, aggressively building participatory capacity can bring substantial bene fits to the basin institution, especially along western river systems. How the water basin institution will design its processes to garner the greatest range of participation possible is an important question. Equally important, however, are the substantive principles and stan dards that will guide the use of its considerable discretionary authority. As illustrated above, some of the most difficult conflicts involve the clash between the economic needs of industrial, agricultural, and urban users, and the noneconomic needs of communities with land-based reli gions, such as the sacred sites and ritual uses of Native American tribes. Also at issue are uses that do not fit easily into either category, such as the interests of acequia communities that use the irrigation ditch system in part for subsistence crops, in part for crops that they sell, but whose use is tied to a strong cultural tradition that is indispensable to the iden tity and cohesion of very old communities struggling to survive in the 21st century. While many state laws contain public welfare standards that can be used to provide some guidance, this standard may be unde fined, poorly defined, or inconsistently defined by the various states within the basin institution's jurisdiction.
66.
69 Juxtapose this poorly de fined concept with the inexorable march toward private markets in western water allocation and in pollution control, and one can easily predict the winners and the losers. Unless basin institutions are care fully designed under a different regulatory paradigm, regulation in a dry land democracy can very easily morph into a brutal zero-sum game. What one can glimpse from this project is a strong sense that outsid ers cannot build a collaborative process, no matter how well-inten tioned or talented the participants might be. Community members persevered through several years of frustrations and setbacks because they had a trusted alliance with an organization with a good track re cord. The facilitator did not allow powerful economic stakeholders to dominate the process with endless debates about evidence and instead focused on the goals and means to acquire needed information and re duce pollution loads. The project survived because the goal-protect ing children's health-was something all participants viewed as important enough to work through difficult issues.
D. Some Exploratory Thoughts on "How
A basin institution, even if it has plenary legal authority, will be suc cessful only if participants can trust that the process has true integrity. it is dominated by powerful water interests, the result will be a continua tion of water wars and litigation. Or if the basin authority proceeds with a single-focus mission to protect the water resource ecologically with out due consideration of the social costs that might be generated, the re sult will be the displacement of communities. One way to attempt to avoid these unintended consequences is to pursue aggressively capac ity building and collaborative approaches. As important as these pro cedural approaches are, however, they may have limited value if the laws favor unfettered market approaches to water allocation and pol lution control. One of the most promising substantive standards in water law is the requirement, adopted by several states, that a request for water alloca tion or transfer should be approved only if it is consistent with the public welfare. This criterion should be fully developed. The standard is insuf ficient if a determination that allocated or transferred water will be put to a beneficial use is a per se satisfaction of the public welfare standard. A more nuanced analysis should be applied. For example, the basin in stitution can consider who is primarily benefitted from the water trans fer and who is burdened, and in particular its effect on rural economic development.
76 Another set of criteria could be developed for a trans fer's effect on land-based religious practices or long standing traditions. Environmental laws have similar standards that can be used; for exam ple, permitting provisions contain omnibus authority to consider such things as "the protection of health," "the protection of welfare," or the "social costs" imposed as a result of a facility's location or processes.77
76. In the acequia context, attorney Benavidez proposes the following criteria for proposed transfers:
• Does only one person benefit in the move-from community or do many people?
• Is whatever benefit occurs a one-time benefit or does [sic] benefits recur over time?
• Is the water right severed from the community or does owner ship remain in the community?
• Is the new economic activity flowing from the water right oc curring in the community or is it removed from the community?
• Does the transaction contribute to the economic development of the community or does the transaction perpetuate, or even wor sen the state of underdevelopment that existed?
• Is agricultural land taken out of production or not?
Benavidez, supra note 23.
77. See Gauna, supra note 11, at 10538, for a discussion of the use of this authority.
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Land use provisions such as buffer zones and development restrictions can also be used; planning tools such as impact statements and � lanned growth strategies can be required and given substantive effect. 8 All of these mechanisms can and should be used to fairly balance the ecologi cal needs of the basin with the anticipated economic and social costs.
IV. Conclusion
In the final analysis, in order for a basin institution to accomplish what institutions have failed to do thus far, it will have to self-consciously confront fundamental ideological conflicts such as whether water is primarily a public resource or primarily for economic exploitation, whether all interests are on equal footing or whether there are some in terests-such as rights of minority populations or the sovereignty of tribes-that should receive maximum protection, and whether the insti tution will adhere to the principle of an unfettered market or not. The basin institution must necessarily adopt a mission much broader than one of protecting the water basin's ecological integrity. It must do so without further injury to vulnerable populations, without displacement of old communities, and without further impainnent of tribal sover eignty and self-determination. Enhancing ecosystem integrity and do ing so without generating these social costs is certain to run up against the enduring expectations of powerful interest groups that have con trolled water use for generations. One way to promote ecological sus tainability in a socially responsible manner is to create an institution that commits resources to building participatory capacity, develops a tradition of respect for the experience and knowledge of populations historically tied to the river system, uses well-thought out collaborative approaches, and uses legal standards and discretionary authority in a courageously protective manner. It is only when difficult social issues are confronted, not only in design but also in ongoing implementation, that the promise and civil potential of a true dry land democracy can be realized.
78. See Arnold, supra note 57.
